Incentives, incentives, Incentives

"Show me the incentive and I will show you the outcome" - Charlie Munger

I’ve found that when you think understanding incentives is really, really important, you still don’t understand how important it is. When you find yourself in a difficult conversation or challenging situation with an employee, a customer, a partner, or a vendor, pause and make sure you understand the incentives of all the stakeholders. It almost always gives you instant clarity and gets you unstuck.

Rule of 40 vs. Real Cash

It seems like whenever we go through a shift in the economy, the fundamentals of finance become increasingly important. During the near-zero interest rate environment we had for more than a decade, growth was rewarded in an outsized way. 10x and 20x revenue multiples were common for startups. Because the risk-free rate of return was near zero, there was no real opportunity cost in investing in something risky. That drove up the value of companies that were investing in big growth. Today, this has changed quite a bit. There is an opportunity cost to investing in something that might not generate cash for a while. So, a lot of the attention has shifted from growth to profitability. Investors want to see cash get generated more quickly. The Rule of 40 (ensuring that a company's operating margin % + its growth rate exceeds 40%) has become a common way of categorizing top-tier startups in this environment. Boards are pushing company leaders to get to Rule of 40 as quickly as possible. Given so many companies are coming out of the grow-at-all-costs approach, the easy thing to do is to pull back on investments, project a conservative growth rate, and drive down costs to make the company's operating margin high enough that it gets the company to 40+ in the next year or two.

This is a potentially short-sighted approach, especially for earlier-stage companies with small revenue. Returning to the fundamentals of finance, we know that the value of a financial asset is the present value of the cash that you can take out of it over its lifetime. Forecasting these cash flows is done using a discounted cash flow model. Revenue multiples and the Rule of 40 are crude proxies for understanding the present value of future cash flows. The danger of the Rule of 40 for smaller companies that aren't generating significant cash flows is that they underinvest in growth to achieve a higher operating margin at a point in time but never get to a point where the company generates high amounts of actual cash.

The Rule of 40 measures a point in time calculated using the % growth rate and the % profit. But companies are not valued on what they're doing right now. And they're not valued on their growth rate. And they're not valued on their profit margins. They're valued on real amounts of cash generated in the future. Rule of 40 can be a useful metric for investors to gauge the health of a business. But that has to be tempered with an understanding of the investments the company is making today to drive future real cash flows. 

One good way to manage this is to classify revenue and cost projections into two buckets. 1/ Core: revenue that will be generated from investments made in the past, and 2/ New: revenue that will be generated from new investments. Leaders need to really understand the future cash flows associated with their core business and whether or not that will produce adequate cash flows relative to expectations. That provides the input needed to throttle investments in new initiatives. The core should get more profitable and the new stuff should drive lots of new revenue. Blending the two and optimizing to a short-term metric runs the risk of severing the company’s execution plan from what’s best for investors over the long term.

Two Rules For Negotiating

There are two rules for negotiating that are absolutely essential.

1/ Be able to make the other side's argument as effective or (ideally) more effective than they can. If you can't do this, then you’re lacking empathy for the other side which is very dangerous. If you can’t do this, then you likely don't truly understand the issues at hand, which means you won't be as effective as you could be. Never negotiate without doing this. 

2/ Internalize your BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement). A lot of people know what this is, but very few do it, often because they don't even want to consider the idea that they won't get a deal done. You have to go there. If you don't play out the worst-case scenario in your mind, internalize it, and understand that if you can’t get a deal done the sun will still come up in the morning, you are in a much weaker place. Get comfortable with your walk-away position. 

These are two simple things that very few people do consistently. Following these rules will make you much more effective at getting to a deal that works well for both sides. 

Value Chains & Charter Communications Versus ESPN

The recent contract dispute between Charter Communications (the large telecom provider) and ESPN (a Disney subsidiary) is possibly this generation's most compelling business strategy story. It goes back several decades and it hit a tipping point in the last few weeks when Charter removed ESPN from its cable bundle. Ben Thompson from Stratechery has been writing some fabulous stuff about all of this that I highly recommend reading. 

It's complicated and convoluted but the short version is that for years ESPN has been charging the cable companies extremely high per-subscriber rates to allow them to include their content in the cable bundle. Live sports content has always been a major driver for cable subscriptions. You can't really offer cable if you don't have live sports. And ESPN has held extremely lucrative sports contracts with MLB, the NFL, the NHL, and others. This allowed ESPN to keep raising rates on the cable companies. Cable companies consistently passed this onto consumers in the form of increased subscriber rates but that could only go so far. Ultimately it had to be taken out of the cable companies’ margins and they were suffering as a result. ESPN was loving life. They leveraged the cable companies to acquire new subscribers and then leveraged the cable bundle that included content providers like CNN, TBS, Food Network, etc., to lock in their customers and experience near-zero churn (requiring that your product be bundled into a set of other products that appeal to different users with different use cases is probably the #1 way to retain customers). To make it worse, ESPN also went around the cable companies and offered a direct internet-based TV service (ESPN+) that had exclusive content that they wouldn't show on cable. As a golf fan, I know this firsthand. The first two days of major tournaments can often only be watched on ESPN+ and not cable. So ESPN was gouging the cable companies on their distribution contracts and then devaluing their distribution partner and generating even more revenue by going around them. 

The tables finally started to turn when broadband internet became by far the major growth and profit driver for the cable companies. Because of ESPN and other content providers's high rates, and consumers starting to churn and move to the streaming providers, Charter, in particular, started to care a lot less about cable television. This came to a head a few weeks ago when they removed ESPN from their bundle to get ESPN to bring their rates down and offer the cable companies a much better deal. To put the screws to ESPN, when the subscriber tried to tune into ESPN, Charter was planning to include a message that said something like, "We no longer offer ESPN, if you'd like to watch ESPN, please sign up for YouTubeTV or some other streaming service", of course, requiring the consumer to sign up via Charter broadband. This would be really bad news for ESPN, as those companies pay ESPN a far lower per-subscriber rate and churn rates are much higher (ESPN learned the hard way that big tech has a lot more leverage than a regional cable provider). Charter and ESPN finally reached an agreement that was much more favorable to Charter just before Monday Night Football aired on ESPN last week.

ESPN had the dominant position and they took advantage of it and over time they got greedy and ended up weakening their own negotiating position. That's what's so interesting about all of this. They took it so far that Charter just didn't care about ESPN or even cable TV anymore. The value chain that allowed ESPN to flourish for so many years has started to collapse.

There's a lot more to this story, and ESPN may be the winner over the long term for a variety of reasons. And if you're interested in this kind of thing, I'd recommend following it closely. This is nowhere near over, and in fact, it's going to get a lot more interesting in the coming years.

All of this is such a good reminder that companies need to deeply understand where they sit in the value chain and adapt as the structure of that value chain changes over time. This one is so complex because there are so many important and powerful players with different incentives and varying degrees of leverage: sports team owners, sports leagues, telecom companies, content providers, and now a new and enormous threat from big tech (Prime Video, YoutubeTV, AppleTV, etc.). 

If your business model and your position inside the value chain seems too good to be true, it probably is, and you can be sure it won't stay that way forever.

The Human Element In Corporate Failures

Business media and business school case studies love to cite big business failures (Kodak, Borders, Blockbuster, Blackberry, etc.) and talk about how foolish and incompetent management was for leading the company into the ground. It's fun to look back on management's mistakes, discuss them, and hopefully learn from them. When you review these mistakes in hindsight, a certain comfort comes from thinking you wouldn't have been so dumb.

The thing that these stories and case studies miss is the real-life context surrounding management that contributed to the decisions they made. And to me, that's a lot more interesting. I'd argue that often — perhaps most of the time — these people aren't dumb at all. It's much more complicated.

In real-life corporate decision-making, there are multiple factors that contribute to decision-making that those looking back from the outside can't see.

1/ Incentive structures and timelines that drive short-term thinking, e.g., a CEO who's incentivized to focus on this year's stock price. That incentive is in perfect conflict with longer-term strategic transformation (Kodak investing in digital cameras at the time would’ve been an expensive and risky bet that likely wouldn't have paid off during that CEO's tenure, as one simple example).

2/ The personal motivations of individual leaders. In many ways, a company is just a vehicle to drive individual people's self-interest (investment returns, personal compensation, resume-building, fulfilling the company's mission, having power, etc.), and more often than not, that self-interest isn't in full alignment which makes strategic decision making extremely difficult.

3/ Politics around strategic direction. Related to incentives, leaders, in the moment, particularly leaders who may be struggling in their role, often aren't aligned with the long-term growth of the company. They might be thinking about saving their job this week or this month. With that context, leaders are more inclined to lean towards "people pleasing" versus doing the right thing for the company. So, if a board of directors wants to go in one direction and management wants to go in another, management may defer to the board (to keep their job). Or one leader may defer to another leader to improve their reputation with that leader because that leader has a better relationship with the CEO. There are hundreds of little dynamics like this inside any company that are in conflict with doing the right thing. Put more clearly, “keeping one’s job”, in many cases, negatively correlates with good long-term strategic decision-making.

4/ Distractions. When a company is operating at scale, there are always fires to put out and urgent threats to the existing business. This can distract management from spending adequate time on larger, longer-term threats that are harder to see. Of course, the answer is to focus on both. But depending on the complexity and severity of the urgent threats, that’s a lot easier said than done and inconsistent with human nature. These distractions and their importance rarely make their way into case studies or the business press.

I could go on and on.

Leading companies at scale is extremely difficult. It's easy to say that Kodak should've dropped everything and invested in digital cameras. Or that Blockbuster was too late on video streaming. That's easy and, frankly, not that interesting. Identifying that gives you a C+ or a D-. It's much more interesting to try to understand the context that makes doing what seems like the obvious thing so incredibly difficult. Learning from that and creating an environment where leaders and leadership teams can make the best possible decisions is a much more challenging task. Leaders and leadership teams that can do that deserve an A+.

Capital Allocation Inside Companies

I loved this Tweetstorm from The Secret CFO on capital allocation.

You should read it in full, but the key point for me is that if a company has capital to invest, the default position should always be to return it to shareholders via a stock buyback or a dividend.

There are three things a company can do with capital:

1/ strengthen their balance sheet (hold cash or pay down debt)
2/ invest in growth
3/ return capital to shareholders.

The default position should be #3.

There’s an old saying that “profitable companies have run out of ideas.” Meaning that if you make a profit it means you’re not investing in new products and services that will drive future growth. This is a fun saying, but it sort of implies there’s something wrong with being out of ideas or taking a profit. Of course, there’s nothing wrong with this. Companies are designed to create shareholder value. Generating profits and giving the cash back to investors so that they can go out and spend it or invest it as they please is the definition of creating shareholder value. Apple, the most profitable company in the country, had a net income of just under $100 billion last year and paid out a large part of it to shareholders in the form of dividends. They’ve created a high hurdle for new investments in growth. If they don’t expect a new initiative to create a huge amount of value, they default to returning that capital to shareholders.

Obviously, in the early stages of a company, the priority has to be building something such that generating profits is even possible. In these cases, all available capital goes towards growth. But later-stage companies that are generating a material amount of cash through their core business should default to giving capital back to shareholders. Using this as the default position creates a very healthy discipline, ensuring that new investments in growth are fully thought through and approved with the proper amount of analysis, rigor, and skepticism.

First Principles Thinking & Product Design

Will Ahmed, the founder of the Whoop, a popular fitness tracker, wrote a great Tweetstorm the other day about the wearables space. In it, he demonstrated an excellent example of first principles thinking around building a product. I wrote a post about the importance of first principles thinking in company building a couple of years ago. I found this Tweet inside of the Tweetstorm from Will to be the most striking.

 
 

This is a perfect example of first principles thinking in company building that sets out a framework for product managers to make literally thousands of small (and big), follow-on design decisions. The increase in efficiency and speed of decision-making is nearly infinite when leaders think and communicate this way.

Not to mention, it’s also a great strategy. Very few products can remain “cool”, for everyone, for many years. Whoop knows this and from day one (it seems) they’ve been pushing to get closer and closer to invisible, while most of their predecessors have tried to be cool and stay cool. A strategy of being cool while working towards invisible seems like a far more sustainable approach.

DoorDash’s Empathy Policy

I read the other day that DoorDash is requiring all of their employees (including their CEO) to make at least one food delivery per month. A lot of engineers were less than thrilled with the idea.

I love this idea. One of the challenges in building b2b software is that your product/engineering team is often very disconnected from the user and the user's problems. DoorDash is lucky that many of its employees likely use the product from the consumer side. That's a massive advantage because they have built-in empathy for the user.

But they're also building for the business user (the Dasher), and many/most employees at DoorDash likely have little to no experience delivering food to a customer. Forcing them to do it once a month drives business user empathy and, likely, a much, much more delightfully built business-facing product.

Throughout most of my career, I've worked with companies that build software products for business users. So I've experienced this challenge first hand. If you're building software for, say, police departments, it's highly likely that most of your engineers will never have worked at a police department. There's nothing wrong with this. Their job is to build software. You want people that are great at building software, not great at enforcing the law. But that means that there is an inherent lack of empathy for the user that has to be dealt with proactively. That's why I love DoorDash's decision to get product managers and engineers out in the field to really feel what their Dashers feel. There's no doubt this will result in a better product.

One exercise I'd challenge b2b software companies to work through is to take stock of how many employees they have that truly have been in the user's shoes. Using the example above, it's worth asking how many employees inside the company have worked for a police department or have had a job where they "could've" used the product they're building? Lots of companies wouldn't have a great answer to that question. And that's ok. But those companies have to make proactive moves to drive empathetic product development.

DoorDash's policy is an excellent step in that direction.

Irreplaceable vs. Replaceable

Here's the story of a company and a founder that has been told many times.

A company has become huge. They've had overwhelming success. But they've become slow and bureaucratic, and innovation has slowed. It's become a boring place to work.

A star employee, let's call her Jane, sees a clear opportunity to improve the company's situation. She has some great ideas on how to breathe fresh growth into the company. Jane's ideas are ignored. Nobody listens to her.

But Jane can't get her ideas out of her head. She needs to pursue her idea. So she leaves the company, raises some money, and builds a product and a company around her idea.

In order to succeed, Jane needs to build a great team. Because there are so many challenges in launching a new company that will beat the incumbents, she needs a team of superstars. She needs to hire people that are amazing. People that are able to run through walls. People that are irreplaceable.

So Jane builds a team full of stars.

And it works. The team of stars is able to take market share and grow rapidly. They have lots of success. They scale and have hundreds of employees. Soon they have thousands of employees.

Now, Jane's burden isn't to disrupt a business or industry; her burden is to protect what she's built. At this point, Jane needs to hire people that are replaceable. If someone is irreplaceable, that's a problem. She needs to build systems and processes and support around her employees so that no single employee is critical to the company's success.

Jane's company has gone from requiring people that are irreplaceable to requiring people that are replaceable. And the cycle continues…

As startups grow, they shift from breaking new ground to protecting their ground. This shift happens gradually and impacts some functions and roles before others. It's very difficult for companies to make this shift. It requires adaptable people, different people, and lots of process building. And you obviously will always need lynchpin employees in some roles.

The irreplaceable vs. replaceable concept is a simple framework for how to think about company building in the later stages of growth.

How To Structure A Commercial Organization

There are several different ways to structure a commercial organization. Markets, products, segments, etc. The model I prefer is to structure the teams around metrics. This does a few things:

1/ It ensures that the organization has a metrics mindset. Sometimes people forget what metric their work moves. Building the org around metrics makes this nearly impossible.

2/ It ensures everyone knows they’re contributing. There’s nothing worse than coming to work each day and doing a bunch of work that doesn’t actually contribute to a business objective.

3/ It helps with prioritization. Teams should prioritize their work based on the impact it’ll have on the metrics. Focus on low effort/high return work, and avoid high effort/low return work. It’s amazing how few people have this mindset.

I separate a commercial org into three buckets. If you’re not directly contributing to one of these three buckets or supporting someone that does then you’re on the wrong team. Commercial orgs only do three things:

1/ They sell stuff.
2/ They implement stuff.
3/ They retain stuff.

Everyone should be impacting at least one of those things. Then assign a set of metrics with targets against each. Here are some examples:

1/ Selling stuff (bookings, upsells, expansions, new logos).
2/ Implementing stuff (speed to go-live, quality of implementation, cost of implementation).
3/ Retaining stuff (retention, renewals, net promoter score, user activity).

I’ve found that structuring the team around these three activities and some set of metrics ensures that everyone has clarity on their role, their value, and how they’re impacting the business in a positive way.

Sales Forecasting: Supply & Demand

 
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A common mistake made by sales leaders when building out a sales forecast is only considering the "supply-side" of their forecasting model.

That is, the model will include some version of the following inputs:

  • # of Reps

  • Quota

  • Discount on quota

  • Ramp-up time

  • Rep turnover rate

They'll put all of those inputs into a spreadsheet and come up with a projection. 

This is a crucial step in the process. If you want to generate $100 million in revenue, you need a model that will tell you how many reps you'll need to hire; e.g what is the "supply" of reps you need to get to your number? 

But this is only half of the equation. The other half of the equation is the demand-side. You have enough reps to sell $100 million but is there enough market demand to sell $100 million? If there isn't enough demand, you now have two problems: 1/ you're not going to hit your number and 2/ you have too many reps.

To avoid that outcome, a sales leader must put an equal amount of energy into the demand-side of the model. Typically, that will include these inputs:

  • Total addressable market (TAM): this is the number that you could hit if you sold to every potential buyer of your product in the current period.

  • Serviceable addressable market (SAM): this is the number you could hit if you sold to every potential buyer in the markets that you serve in the current period. For example, if your product is only live in half of the U.S. market your SAM would be 50% of TAM. This could also be limited by specific verticals or buyer types that you’re currently servicing.

  • Serviceable Obtainable market (SOM): this is the amount SAM that you can realistically obtain. Because of competition, delivery constraints, etc. you're not going to be able to sell 100% of SAM.

So, in order to be comfortable that there's enough market demand to get to $100 million, your SOM must exceed $100 million. There's no doubt that great salespeople and great sales teams can create demand that isn't there, but this doesn't scale and it’s a dangerous assumption to make. It’s crucial that sales leaders understand the actual market demand for the products they’re selling as it exists today.

The demand-side of the model is often more difficult to calculate than the supply-side because it's generally harder to understand and control — particularly in the early days. But there's a long line of sales leaders that made the mistake of not paying enough attention to demand and thus over-hired and missed their numbers. That’s the kiss of death for any sales leader. Applying equal rigor to both the supply-side and the demand-side of a sales forecast is the best way to avoid that outcome.